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ABSTRACT
This thesis presents the development of a demand 
equation for symphony orchestras and a three equation, 
simultaneous model examining factors which influence 
nonprofit executive compensation. Results from the demand 
equation demonstrate that nonprofit orchestras operate in 
the inelastic portion of the demand curve. Thus, ticket 
sales generate negative marginal revenues and attendance is 
increased at the expense of profit. If total revenue is 
less than total cost, the orchestra must be subsidized by 
contributions from private and public sectors. The 
compensation model indicates that salary is positively 
correlated with the ability to increase contributions and 
improve organizational quality. Therefore, administrators 
seeking to enhance income and marketability would do well to 
focus their energizes on these two critical areas. 
Additionally, private contributions and quality respond 
positively to executive pay. Organizations seeking to 
enhance their reputation by increasing their level of 
service will bid up the salary of superior managers.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
TITLE PAGE .......................................... i
APPROVAL PAGE ........................................ ii
ABSTRACT ............................................. iii
LIST OF TABLES ....................................... v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ..................................... vi
Chapter
1. CHARACTERISTICS OF NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES ....... 1
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ....................... 6
3 . DEVELOPING THE MODEL ...........................  12
4. THE DATA .......................................  18
5. THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS ........................... 23
6. CONCLUSIONS ...................................  2 9
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................ 33
iv
LIST OF TABLES
Table Page
1. Orchestras With Expenses Over $3,500,000 (1987-1988). 20
2. Variables: Names and Definitions ...................  21
3. Variables: Descriptive Statistics ..................  22
4. Estimates of the Structural Equations .............  26
v
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank the members of my thesis 
committee who allowed this project to be a true learning 
experience. Thanks to Dr. Assane, who provided the 
constructive criticism and attention to detail required for 
such an undertaking. Thanks to Dr. Brown, who established 
the appropriate editorial tone for the paper. And special 
thanks to Dr. Carroll, who showed me the path. I would also 
like to thank Dr. William Luksetich, visiting professor to 
U.N.L.V., who graciously allowed me the use of his data set.
vi
1CHAPTER 1
CHARACTERISTICS OF NONPROFIT ENTERPRISES
Traditional microeconomic theory assumes that firms 
seek to maximize profits. In order for a firm to achieve 
this enviable position, it must be managed by executives 
with the same objective. Thus, conventional wisdom holds 
that the salaries of corporate executives should be tied 
directly to their firm's profitability. In this manner, 
executives are provided with a strong, sure motivation to 
maximize the firm's profits, since these gains are highly 
correlated with their own under a properly structured 
compensation scheme.
While tying executive salaries to profitability may 
suffice in the corporate world, how are levels of 
compensation established in enterprises without a profit 
motive? How does one keep score when the game is neither 
won nor lost on the basis of total revenue minus total cost, 
return on investment, or earnings per share? How does one 
determine whether or not a nonprofit firm is successful? 
Indeed, if profit were no longer a motive, then what new 
criteria should be established in order to objectively judge 
executive performance and thus set a corresponding level of 
compensation?
2First, what organizations are part of the nonprofit 
sector? Not-for-profit enterprises provide services to the 
community without seeking a profit. Copeland and Smith 
describe such concerns as "the performing arts, museums, 
hospitals, libraries, universities, churches, volunteer 
health organizations, research organizations, credit unions, 
labor unions, fraternal organizations, professional 
societies, farm collectives, and foundations111 to be typical 
examples of nonprofit organizations.
Three areas exist in which profit and nonprofit 
enterprises differ: tax status, goods and services, and
sources of income. Of these three areas, one stands out as 
the primary distinguishing feature between profit and 
nonprofit businesses: sources of income. In contrast to
private and governmental agencies, nonprofits garner a 
substantial percentage of their income from external, 
voluntary contributions.
This dependence on contributions for income in a 
particular nonprofit organization has an effect on the 
nonprofit executive's decision-making process. The greater 
the percentage of revenue coming from contributions, the 
greater the executive's desire to maximize his benefactor's 
utility. When someone makes a contribution, he surrenders
1Thomas E. Copeland and Keith V. Smith, "An Overview of
Nonprofit Organizations," Journal of Economics and Business. Vol. 30,
No. 2, (Winter 1978), p. 147.
claim to that favor in return for an anticipated increase in 
his own utility. Thus, if the executive desires to maintain 
a healthy operation over the long term, he must search for 
those projects that will simultaneously appeal to current 
benefactors and attract potential contributors. Indeed, it 
is hard to imagine a successful manager of a symphony 
orchestra who does not schedule performances with his 
contributors in mind. Therefore, in contrast to the 
executive of a profit-seeking corporation who constantly 
strives to maximize profits on behalf of his shareholders (a 
utility maximizing policy for firm owners), the executive in 
a not-for-profit firm seeks to maximize the utility of his 
patrons.
The nature of financial management found within 
not-for-profit firms is also fundamentally different from 
its private sector cousins. First, we discover that the 
methodology used for counting "beans" differs between a 
profit-oriented company (assets = liabilities + equity) and 
a nonprofit one (assets = liabilities + funds, where the 
expression "funds" liberally defines one source of possible 
organizational financing). We discover in these two 
equations a fundamental difference in ownership. A private 
company has a direct claim to a share of its assets via its 
equity position; a nonprofit firm does not. The nonprofit 
firm replaces equity with "funds" to indicate the source of 
its life's blood, financing, usually in the form of public
donations, ticket sales, and/or membership fees. One may 
argue that the profit motive found in the private sector is 
replaced in nonprofit businesses by the fund-raising motive.
Many nonprofits display an effort on behalf of 
management to increase the foundation of subscriber support. 
However, this process carries its own set of risks to be 
balanced against possible rewards. What if management 
embarks on a policy which results in one group of supporters 
withdrawing its support while another group increases its 
contributions. Is this policy efficient? The answer 
depends on the goals of the organization. Since no shares 
are traded in an open market, as is the case with publicly 
traded firms, non-traded partnerships, and sole 
proprietorships, management lacks a short term feedback 
apparatus to gauge the effects of its policy decisions. As 
a result, management could implement policies which are 
inefficient and reduce subscriber utility, and ultimately, 
contributions.
A nonprofit firm may also operate under certain 
fiduciary restrictions. Whereas private companies may use 
their profits at the discretion of management, i.e. 
dividends, research and development, upgrading facilities, 
additional marketing, expansion into other markets, or even 
increased salaries for themselves, nonprofits may be 
constrained by stipulations placed upon donations. Gifts to 
nonprofit entities are often made conditionally, with, for
instance, restrictions on how they may be used. Perhaps the 
gift is earmarked for a new building or for the endowment of 
a scholarship to assist the underprivileged. As the 
scenario is repeated, the nonprofit finds itself with 
various "fund" classifications in its budget, i.e. building 
fund, capital fund, purchasing fund, membership fund, and 
advertising fund. Thus, while the nonprofit may appear to 
have adequate capital reserves to meet high priority goals 
or unexpected disasters, it may not have the freedom to 
allocate these reserves effectively.2
In this thesis, the factors which determine executive 
compensation in the not-for-profit sector are studied.
Using symphony orchestras as an example of a nonprofit 
industry, a model of these factors is developed and tested. 
The study proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 reviews the
literature; Chapter 3 discusses the development of the 
model; Chapter 4 describes the data used; Chapter 5 
analyzes the empirical findings; and, Chapter 6 offers 
conclusions.
2Ibid., pp. 147-152.
6CHAPTER 2 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Is the level of pecuniary compensation the only 
motivating factor in the life of a nonprofit executive? If 
one believes current headlines, executives in the profit 
oriented sector of American business seek to maximize their 
own net worth, sometimes even at the expense of the 
companies for which they work. What objective does a 
manager in the nonprofit world seek to maximize, if not 
personal income? Perhaps nonprofit firms attract nonprofit 
managers, those who are more concerned with providing what 
they perceive to be a valuable service to their communities 
rather than merely increasing their level of disposable 
income.
Anne Preston suggests that nonprofit executives accept 
positions at below market wages in exchange for the 
opportunity to deliver goods and services with social 
externalities. Thus, the motive to maximize income is 
replaced with the desire to maximize one's contribution to 
the enrichment of society.
Preston drew three fundamental conclusions from her 
empirical research: (1) the not-for-profit industrial
sector is primary a low wage sector; (2) the difference
in wages, which may be as much as 20%, is not completely 
explained by differences in the individual's human capital, 
geographical location, or the presence of compensating 
differentials found in similar occupations between the two 
sectors; and (3) that a negative nonprofit differential 
results from the differences between the level of social 
benefits provided by for-profit and nonprofit companies.
Viewing a nonprofit firm as a provider of private and 
social benefits, she establishes a total benefit function 
for the industry as:
TB (x) = <|>(x) + SB (x) , 0' (x) > 0, SB' > 0
<])" (x) <0, SB" < 0
where
TB (x) = total benefits generated by consumption of 
x;
<)> (x) = private benefits;
SB(x) = social benefits.
Social benefits are defined as "social externalities, 
benefits enjoyed by parties external to the transaction, or, 
more specifically, by society as a whole."3 Nonprofit 
orchestras, as an example, thus supply benefits in the form 
of personal entertainment to those purchasing tickets, while 
simultaneously providing social benefits in the form of 
cultural awareness and increased educational opportunities.
3Anne E. Preston, "The Nonprofit Worker in a For-Profit World," 
Journal of Labor Economics. Vol. 7, No. 4, (October 1989), p. 440.
Nonprofits, in contrast to profit-orientated firms, furnish 
services which may provide significant social benefits, 
otherwise for-profit firms would choose to supply them.
Realizing that nonprofit organizations have the right 
to solicit tax deductible donations from companies, 
foundations, and individuals, Preston incorporates a 
donation function into her model. These donations reflect 
the organization's social benefits as well as its 
efficiency:
D = D[SB(x),E], DSB > 0, DE > 0
where
D = aggregate supply of donations and 
E = organizational efficiency.
In the labor market, the executive chooses between the 
profit and nonprofit firms based on his own utility 
function:
U[SB(x) ,w] , Uw > 0, USB > 0
where
U = utility and 
w = wages.
Thus, the executive's utility is a positive function with 
respect to wages and the level of social benefit created by 
his employment. In this function, executives place a 
positive value to increasing social well-being and are
9willing to exchange wages for expanded social benefits, a 
labor donation.
In developing her wage model, Preston states that:
because workers have heterogeneous preferences, each 
nonprofit firm faces a pool of potential workers 
with varying tastes for social welfare. The minimum 
wage necessary to attract the required number of 
nonprofit workers will be less than the for-profit 
wage if the pool of workers who receive utility from 
provision of social benefits is at least as great as 
the number of workers demanded by the firm:4
wmin = w' - LD (1D, SB) , LD1d < 0, LDsb > 0
where
w' = competitive wage in the profit sector;
LD = aggregate supply of labor donations;
1D = firm's labor demand.
Inasmuch as the disposition of these "labor donations" rise 
simultaneously with increases in social benefits, those 
companies which bestow a greater contribution in terms of 
social benefits will be able to pay less in wages, ceteris 
paribus.
Applying comparative static analysis to the model 
discloses two interesting predications concerning behavior 
in a nonprofit framework. (1) The labor donations supplied 
by executives eager to work for those firms producing 
services which benefit society result in a downward pressure 
upon their own wages. (2) The greater the correlation
"ibid., p. 442.
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between the level of donations and the efficiency of the 
organization, the greater the pressure will be for nonprofit 
executives to utilize their financial resources effectively. 
So, even if an executive wished to use a portion of his 
firm's surplus to increase his salary, he could not do so 
above the market-clearing level without running the danger 
of losing donor support.5
Another segment of the economy which possesses 
characteristics similar to the nonprofit industry is the 
public sector. The politician (a public executive) replaces 
the motive to maximize profit with the desire to maximize 
his probability of winning reelection to either his current 
office, or perhaps even to a higher one. As William H. 
Anderson notes:
The role of the elected public official (or the 
would-be office holder) in the process of collective 
choice corresponds to that of the entrepreneur in 
the private sector. We would not be far off base if 
we say that the politician seeks to maximize his own 
utility by maximizing his "political" profits," 
namely, his voter support and political influence. 
Just as the private sector "punishes" an 
entrepreneur who fails to satisfy the desires of his 
customers ... so the political process "punishes" 
competitors for office who fail to gain enough 
support either to win or retain office.6
5Ibid., pp. 438-443.
6William H. Anderson, Financing Modern Government: The
Political Economy of the Public Sector (Boston: Houghton, 1973), p. 41,
quoted in James E. Annable, Jr., "A Theory of Wage Determination in 
Public Employment," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Business. Vol. 
14, No. 4, (Winter 1974), p. 46.
James Annable states that the probability of someone 
currently holding public office successfully seeking 
reelection is a function of his ability to generate loyalty 
among his constituency. This loyalty is determined by two 
primary factors: (1) his support for low levels of taxation
combined with (2) his capacity to generate high levels of 
service. Failure to achieve support from one's constituency 
results not in an economic loss, but instead in an increased 
level of public dissatisfaction, stemming from increasing 
taxes and/or deteriorating services. As in the nonprofit 
sector, the executive's continued employment and his level 
of compensation is dependent upon his ability to effectively 
manage his resources and satisfy his customers.7
7Annable, pp. 43-46.
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CHAPTER 3 
DEVELOPING THE MODEL
The first step in developing an executive compensation 
model is examining the market environment of the orchestras. 
For all practical purposes, any given symphony orchestra 
exerts monopolistic control within its sphere of influence, 
i.e., metropolitan area. Clearly, each orchestra examined 
in this study fits the definition of a monopolistic 
enterprise: (1) each major population center has one
primary symphony orchestra; (2) an absence exists of 
current or potential rivals due to the unique qualities of 
the organization's services, i.e., live concerts and 
recorded productions of classical music; and, (3) these 
goods have no close substitutes. If one desires to 
experience a concert production, little choice exists except 
to attend a local performance. Each orchestra sells a 
unique product, its own individual rendition of the written 
music.
Since we are dealing with a monopolistic industry, 
supply curves are not well defined and characterization of a 
suitable demand function is all important. Employing a 
log-linear demand equation, where exponents are interpreted 
as the elasticities of the dependent variable with respect
13
to the independent variables, we establish the following:
Qa = aPblQAb2TNOCb3PCIw (1.1).
where
Qd = quantity demanded measured in annual per 
capita attendance;
P = ticket price;
QA = quality of performance;
TNOC = total number of annual concerts;
PCI = per capita income for metropolitan area.
Consumer purchasing patterns follow the law of 
demand; the quantity demanded of a product or service will 
be inversely related to its price, ceteris paribus. 
Accordingly, the demand function employs attendance as a 
measure of quantity. Attendance should be negatively 
related to ticket price and be positively related to 
performance quality, the number of concerts during a season, 
and per capita income.
Also, if orchestra services were supplied by a profit 
orientated monopoly, demand would be price elastic. 
Imperfectly competitive firms will produce their output in 
the elastic portion of their demand curves so that marginal 
revenue is greater than zero. In this case, since marginal 
cost is not negative, the profit-maximizing condition of 
marginal revenue equals marginal cost exists only when 
demand is unitary price elastic or when the auditorium is 
filled to capacity. Thus, the orchestra's price elasticity 
of demand is important.
However, what type of elasticity can be anticipated
14
for a nonprofit environment? An orchestra setting its 
ticket price in the inelastic portion of the demand curve 
experiences negative marginal revenues. Normally, this 
price structure would severely damage a business enterprise. 
However, as a nonprofit concern, the losses resulting from 
ticket sales are compensated by way of private donations and 
public grants. An orchestra which sets its ticket prices at 
a level lower than the profit maximizing rate expands its 
customer base, allowing those who could not otherwise afford 
a ticket the chance to attend, and its level of service to 
the community. Therefore, an inelastic price level would 
suggest that orchestras do not seek to maximize profits and 
would confirm that we are dealing with a genuine nonprofit 
industry. So, the price elasticity of demand is expected to 
be negative and between 0 and -l.8
Having examined those factors which influence demand 
for an orchestra's services and confirm the nonprofit nature 
of its business activities, the determinants of executive 
compensation may be examined. The following relationship is 
based on a theoretical model of not-for-profit compensation. 
The system of equations is as follows:
Salary = f(Q A, PF)
QA = f(Salary, PU, TNOC)
PF - f(Salary, PU, POP, COU, ADV) (1.4)
(1 .2 )
(1.3)
“Thomas M. Carroll, Microeconomic Theory: Concepts and
Applications (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983), pp. 397-399.
where
Salary = executive compensation;
QA = quality;
PF = level of contributions from private
donations;
PU = level of contributions from public
funding;
TNOC = total number of annual concerts;
POP = metropolitan area population;
COU = dummy variable for country (0 = U.S.A.
and 1 = Canada);
ADV = advertising expenses.
Within this model, the endogenous variables are salary, 
quality, and private funding while the exogenous variables 
are public funding, number of annual concerts, metropolitan 
area population, country, and advertising expenses. 
Consequently, we observe that the salary and quality 
equations are overidentified and the private funding 
equation is exactly identified.
In this model the dependent variable, salary, has a 
feedback effect on the independent variables, quality and 
private funding. While compensation is influenced by the 
executive's ability to increase the quality of his 
organization and to generate private support, the 
orchestra's level of excellence, i.e. prestige, and the 
level of private funding also depend upon his level of 
administrative and political expertise. Clearly, a 
simultaneous relationship exists between those factors 
(quality and private donations) an executive may enhance to 
improve his own financial status and those same factors an 
organization seeks to improve by hiring highly skilled
16
administrators.
In the quality function, salary and the level of 
public funding are expected to have a positive effect on the 
orchestra's quality. A higher salary might indicate a more 
competent executive who would naturally be able to improve 
the quality of his product. Greater public support would 
generate the additional income necessary to employ higher 
caliber musicians. Increases in the number of concerts 
during a season would have a detrimental effect on the 
orchestras quality, as fatigue, limited practice time, and 
an overly broad repertoire would eventually effect the 
musicians' performance.
Executive compensation and advertising expenses will 
have a positive influence on private funding. Again, a more 
seasoned executive will exhibit greater interpersonal 
communication skills, leading to better public relations and 
increased donations. The orchestra's ability to generate 
contributions from the public is also related to the amount 
of resources designated for advertising expenses. In other 
words, "It does pay to advertise." On the other side, the 
amount of public funding and the area's population have a 
negative impact on fundraising efforts. Public funding 
serves as a substitute to private funding. As the level of 
public support increases, private support decreases. People 
have a tendency to contribute less if they believe 
government will provide adequate support, i.e. the "free
rider" problem. Additionally, the greater the population, 
the more likely individuals will believe that others will 
contribute to maintain an organization which provides 
services they may only occasionally wish to consume.
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CHAPTER 4 
THE DATA
The data utilized in this study were obtained from the 
American Symphony Orchestra League in their publication, 
Comparative Statistical Report (1987-88 Season). This 
report contains information about forty metropolitan 
orchestras with expenses in excess of $3,500,000. (See 
Table 1.) These data are placed on a per capita basis.
Unfortunately, among the 214 variables available for 
study, one was missing: executive compensation. In place
of this missing element, the salaries of administrative 
staff were used, since one may assume that a high degree of 
correlation exists between executive and staff salaries.
As quality is a central issue in this research, a 
variable was necessary to serve as a useful measure 
concerning relative differences in the levels of excellence 
between symphonies. Given the presence of a free and 
efficient market for musicians and conductors, those with 
superior talent would naturally gravitate towards 
organizations offering superior wages. As the level of 
talent increased within a given orchestra, so too would the 
quality of its product. Thus, orchestra and regular 
conductors salaries were used as the basis of the quality
19
variable. This variable was then adjusted for the number of 
concerts per season. (See Table 2.)
As revenue data were not available for ticket sales at 
each price level, an average ticket price was generated by 
dividing total concert income by the total attendance.
Also, a dummy variable was utilized in order to 
differentiate between American and Canadian orchestras, 
where American symphonies were designated with a "0" and 
Canadians with a "1."
The typical orchestra in this study services an North 
American community of approximately 2.4 million people with 
a per capita income of $10,657. Its season consists of 167 
concerts, drawing in nearly 453,616 attendees. Advertising 
costs during the year amount to $860,545, or about $1.90 for 
each ticket sold. Administrative salaries account for 
$474,534. Salaries paid to the orchestra members average 
$23,816 per concert. In addition to the revenue generated 
from concert ticket sales (average ticket price is $11.40), 
income is also raised from private contributions 
($2,976,337) and public funds ($1,677,168). (See Table 3.)
TABLE 1
ORCHESTRAS WITH EXPENSES OVER $3,500,000 
1987 - 1988
Boston Los Angeles
Cleveland Chicago
Pittsburgh New York
San Francisco Philadelphia
Cincinnati Minnesota
Toronto Saint Louis
Montreal Atlanta
National Detroit
Baltimore Dallas
Houston Rochester
Indianapolis Milwaukee
Denver Buffalo
National Arts Center Seattle
Oregon San Diego
New Jersey Columbus
Utah Phoenix
Syracuse Saint Paul
Vancouver Honolulu
Pacific Alabama
Phil. Orchestra, Florida Winnipeg
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TABLE 2
VARIABLES: NAMES AND DEFINITIONS
Qd Quantity demanded measured in annual per 
capita attendance.
Attend Total concert attendance/metropolitan area 
population.
P Price, computed as total concert income/ 
attendance.
QA Quality proxy, computed as (orchestra & 
conductor's regular salaries/metropolitan 
area population)/ total number of concerts.
TNOC Total number of annual concerts.
PCI Per capita income from SMSA.
Salary Administrative salaries/metropolitan area 
population.
PF Total private support/metropolitan area 
population.
PU Total public support/metropolitan area 
population.
ADV Total marketing expenses/metropolitan area 
population.
POP Metropolitan area population.
COU Dummy variable for country: 0 = U.S.A. and 
1 = Canada.
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TABLE 3
VARIABLES: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Variable Mean S.D. Maximum Minimum
Admin. Salaries 474534.6 339358.1 1470717 .0 120407.0
Quality 23816.7 9274.1 43540.0 5814.0
Private Funding 2976337.0 1750880.6 6650255.0 48000.0
Public Funding 1677168.1 2198187.9 10777790.0 39250.0
Number of Concerts 167 .4 54.1 343 .0 54.0
Population 2411637.6 1827871.4 8473400.0 625304.0
Advertising 860545.0 475054.9 2335523 .0 193138.0
Country 0.1 0.3 1.0 0.0
Attendance 453616.2 256608.9 1095963.0 182094.0
Ticket Price 11.4 3.2 18.5 5.7
Per Capita Income 10657.9 1765.3 13575.0 6494.0
23
CHAPTER 5 
THE EMPIRICAL RESULTS
This chapter provides results from the demand equation 
and the simultaneous salary model. The demand equation will 
provide an organizational perspective and verify the 
nonprofit nature of the symphony orchestras. The 
compensation model will provide a managerial viewpoint and 
examine the relationship between salary an executive 
performance.
Applying logarithms on both sides of the demand 
equation (1.1) yields a linear functional form where the 
slope coefficients are interpreted as elasticities:
LogeAttend = - 7.6 - . 75981 (logeP) + . 90126 (logeQA) + 
(-3.20)** (-5.53)** (10.06)**
1.2 984 (logeTNOC) + . 546 (logePCI) (2.1)
(7.77)** (2.33)**
R2 = .87; F-statistic = 37.9; N= 28;
where the t-ratios are given in parentheses and conventional 
levels of significance are employed, utilizing a one-sided 
t-test (1% [**] and 5% [*]) . The sign of the ticket price 
coefficient is consistent with our expectations that concert 
attendance follows the law of demand, as it is negative, 
suggesting an inverse relationship between price and 
attendance. Additionally, it is significantly greater than
24
-l,9 thereby supporting the theory that the orchestras 
function as nonprofit enterprises. Furthermore, the 
R-squared of .87 and the F-statistic of 37.9 indicate that 
this model is useful in predicting orchestra attendance at 
any conventional level.
If orchestra attendance were on the elastic portion of 
the demand curve, then it could be that orchestras are 
maximizing profit. If so, development of a compensation 
model would be unnecessary, as economic literature offers 
extensive coverage concerning the relation of executive 
salary to the firm's profit. As this study examines a 
nonprofit industry shown to be operating on the inelastic 
portion of the demand curve, development of a new model for 
executive compensation is essential, since apparently profit 
maximization is not the firm's goal.
Turning to executive compensation, the system of 
equations from Chapter 3 is transformed into the estimating 
forms:
Salary = B0 + Ba(QA) + B2(PF) (2.2)
QA = B0 + Bx (Salary) + B2(PU) + B3(TNOC) (2.3)
PF = B0 + B3 (Salary) + B2(PU) + B3(POP) +
B„ (Country) + B5(ADV) (2.4).
As stated above, this system of equations contains a 
feedback loop in which not only is the salary variable
9 Since tc = (-.75981 - (-1))/.1373 = 1.75*.
I also computed the midpoint elasticity for a linear equation: 
n = -.01256 (11.37/.19352) = -.73.
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effected by quality and private funding, but also that the 
quality and private funding variables are effected by 
salary. The two-stage least squares technique, a method 
applicable to simultaneous equations which are either 
overidentified or exactly identified, is employed to 
overcome this problem.
Since the salary equation (2.2) represents the 
principle component of the above system, its results will be 
reviewed in detail. As may be seen in Table 4, the fitted 
data from the salary equation support the expectation that 
an executive's salary increases in proportion with his 
ability to increase the quality of his orchestra and raise 
capital from private sources. The constant provides the 
base salary for an administrator on a per capita basis (base 
salary = coefficient x population). Thus, an executive's 
compensation is positively affected by his city's 
population. Nonprofit organizations in larger metropolitan 
areas pay more than those in smaller ones, ceteris paribus. 
The quality coefficient indicates that each dollar spent on 
orchestra personnel per capita, per concert (($1.00/ 
population)/number of concerts) results in an increase in 
executive salary corresponding to that ratio multiplied by 
$8.10. The coefficient for private funding reveals that 
each dollar gained through an administrator’s fundraising 
activities results in a 6.7 cent increase in his salary on a 
per capita basis.
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TABLE 4
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL EQUATIONS
Constant
Salary
Quality
Private Funding
Public Funding
Number of Concerts
Population
Country
Advertising
R2
F-statistic
Number
Salary
0.023 
(.446)
8.105** 
(3.017)
0.067** 
(2.390)
Dependent Variable
Quality Private Funding
.366
9.061
40.000
0.015** 
(6 .861)
0 .046** 
(5.607)
0.924** 
(2 .792)
3 .722* 
[1.732)
0 .001* 
(1.881)
-7.895E-05** 
(-6.753)
-0 .268* 
(-2.159)
0.751
34.776
40.000
-9 .558E-08* 
(-1.773)
- 1 .022* *
(-2.603)
0.527 
(.620)
0.545
8.430
40.000
Note: t-ratios are given in parentheses.
** significant at the 1% level.
* significant at the 5% level.
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Examination of the quality equation (2.3) reveals that 
quality is a function of a manager's ability, if one argues 
that salary is a gauge of competence. So that, superior 
administrators will seek to continuously improve the quality 
of their service, providing benefits not only to themselves 
in the form of greater salaries, but also to their audiences 
in terms of exceptional performances.
The private funding equation (2.4) discloses a 
positive relationship between salary and the level of 
charitable contributions. Thus, a solicitor with 
exceptional interpersonal qualities has a significant affect 
upon his organization's funding campaigns. Analysis of the 
public funding and population variables unveils the presence 
of the "free rider" problem with nonprofit organizations.
As evident from the inverse relationship, public funding 
serves as a substitute for private donations. Therefore, 
the more government agencies become patrons of the arts, the 
less individuals will contribute to their maintenance. 
Perhaps, if one were to realize that his (and everyone 
else's) tax dollars were already supporting the arts, he 
would be less inclined to part with his after-tax income. 
Furthermore, as the population increases, per capita 
charitable donations decrease. As a population grows, so 
too the incentive to free ride: individuals are willing to
let others contribute to the ongoing upkeep of local 
nonprofit institutions.
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In conclusion, the evidence supports the theory that 
executive compensation is based on the ability to present a 
quality product and to raise financial support from the 
public. However, we also find that the orchestra's quality 
and fundraising efforts are influenced by the ability of the 
administrator it attracts.
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS
A great deal of research and experimentation has been 
conducted by economists concerning the nature of financial 
compensation found within the business community. However, 
much of this effort has been focused upon the private, 
profit-oriented sector of the economy with comparatively 
little emphasis on nonprofit organizations. Indeed, even 
the most casual reader of today's press could not help but 
notice the controversy regarding the seemingly outlandish 
compensation packages bestowed upon Fortune 500 Chief 
Executive Officers.
This study follows a different path, as it examines 
those factors which influence the salary levels of nonprofit 
administrators. By assuming a holistic approach towards 
model development, this thesis focuses upon both the 
quantitative aspects of administrative performance and the 
qualitative nature of individual character. Thus, the 
results provide a guide for those managers wishing to 
increase their value in the nonprofit marketplace, as well 
as for organizations seeking to upgrade their level of 
service and prestige.
Data about financial activities and economic
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environments of forty metropolitan symphony orchestras were 
collected. A preliminary demand model was developed to 
insure that the sample orchestras did, in fact, behave as 
nonprofit enterprises.
Results from the demand equation yield significant 
information. First, concert attendance for symphonies 
follows the law of demand: as prices increase attendance
decreases. Second, prices are set in the inelastic portion 
of the demand curve, resulting in the generation of negative 
marginal revenues from ticket sales. Thus, a nonprofit firm 
faces the challenge of collecting enough funds to remain 
operational while simultaneously losing money on each sale.
A three equation, simultaneous model was then 
developed to examine the quantitative nature of executive 
compensation. The two-stage least squares technique was 
applied to correct for simultaneous-equation bias resulting 
from the recursive relationship between the dependent 
variable salary and independent variables for quality and 
private funding.
Results from the fitted data support the theory that 
an executive's compensation is in part based upon his 
ability to generate donations and to positively influence 
the quality of his organization's service. A superior 
administrator generates enough funds through charitable 
donations to compensate for the income lost through ticket 
sales, allowing his organization to survive on the inelastic
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portion of the demand curve. Not hampered by the necessity 
to realize a profit, the efficient manager allocates excess 
revenue towards improving his orchestra's level of quality, 
resulting in greater service to the community. Thus, an 
administrator's ability to effectively manage these two 
critical areas increases his own wealth and his 
attractiveness as a potential employee to other nonprofits.
A nonprofit institution may also utilize this model to 
improve its own standing within the community. As stated in 
the demand equation, attendance is a function of quality and 
ticket price. A superior executive will increase an 
organization's quality, resulting in increased attendance. 
Additionally, a first-rate manager will increase the level 
of contributions, allowing for a decrease in ticket prices, 
again resulting in increased attendance. Thus, a nonprofit 
organization may enhance its own reputation by hiring an 
exceptional administrator.
Anne Preston's wage utility model provides an insight 
into the qualitative nature of executive compensation. As 
stated earlier, nonprofit organizations attract nonprofit 
managers. These administrators are willing to trade-off a 
portion of their salary in the form of a "labor donation." 
This labor donation is positively linked to the satisfaction 
they derive from providing a social good. Therefore in 
theory at least, those organizations perceived as providing 
a greater social good should be able to attract higher
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quality managers while offering lower salaries ceteris 
paribus. However, my results indicate that orchestras 
compete for administrative talent: better orchestras pay
more than mediocre orchestras.
This thesis serves as a beginning for continued 
exploration into the nature of nonprofit compensation.
While this model answers some questions, it also raises 
others. Will an executive truly accept a lower salary to 
work where he perceives his efforts providing a greater 
social good? Of interest to those hiring, will he accept a 
lower salary to work for a more prestigious organization? 
Indeed, these issues merit additional study for an 
organization must be careful not to equate previous salary 
history with managerial competence. Also, it cannot assume 
the ability to hire top-flight executives while offering 
substandard wages, believing that the organization's 
prestige will compensate.
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